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Detection and Recovery from Pollution Attacks
in Coding-Based Distributed Storage Schemes
Levente Buttya´n, La´szlo´ Czap, and Istva´n Vajda
Abstract—We address the problem of pollution attacks in coding-based distributed storage systems. In a pollution attack, the
adversary maliciously alters some of the stored encoded packets, which results in the incorrect decoding of a large part of the original
data upon retrieval. We propose algorithms to detect and recover from such attacks. In contrast to existing approaches to solve this
problem, our approach is not based on adding cryptographic checksums or signatures to the encoded packets, and it does not
introduce any additional redundancy to the system. The results of our analysis show that our proposed algorithms are suitable for
practical systems, especially in wireless sensor networks.
Index Terms—Network level security and protection, sensor networks, distributed data storage, network coding, pollution attack,
integrity protection.
Ç
1 INTRODUCTION
IN coding-based distributed storage systems, data arestored in encoded packets in a distributed fashion, such
that each encoded packet is computed by combining
multiple data packets, according to the idea of linear
network coding [1], [2]. In order to retrieve the original
data, a sufficient number of encoded packets must be
collected and decoded together. Such coding-based dis-
tributed storage systems have important emerging applica-
tions, e.g., in peer-to-peer systems and in wireless sensor
networks (WSNs).
We consider multiple distributed sources that generate
data that must be stored efficiently in multiple storage
nodes, each having constrained communication, computa-
tion, and storage capabilities. Storing encoded data, instead
of raw data, can help to increase the efficiency of the
system. In [3], [4], for instance, the following scheme is
proposed: There are k source nodes, each producing a
single data packet of interest (per time epoch), and there are
n storage nodes that are used as a distributed memory for
the k data packets. Each storage node can store a single data
packet. Instead of storing raw data packets, each storage
node stores a linear combination of a subset of them. The
random coding techniques (distributed erasure codes,
fountain codes) introduced in [4], [5], [6] ensure that, for
appropriately selected parameters, a collector node can
reconstruct all the k data packets with high probability by
downloading the encoded packets from any k storage nodes
and solving a system of linear equations (SLEs). Thus, the
collector node can retrieve the data of interest from k nearby
nodes, which results in decreased delay in data reconstruc-
tion and lower traffic load in the network.
While coding may increase the efficiency of distributed
storage systems in a benign environment, it also has a
potential problem in hostile environments, where an
adversary may attack the storage nodes. In particular, the
problem that we are interested in this paper is the so called
pollution attack [7], whereby the adversary modifies some of
the stored encoded data, which results in erroneous
decoding of a large part of the original data upon retrieval.
Note that these coding schemes mix (typically linearly
combine) blocks of the original data; therefore, a single
corrupted encoded block can affect the decoding of multiple
data blocks. This amplification effect of the pollution attack
is particularly annoying and undesirable.
Our main contribution in this paper is a novel informa-
tion theoretic approach to counteract pollution attacks in
coding-based distributed storage systems.1 Compared to
other approaches in the same vein, we do not add
redundancy to the data packets, but rather, we take
advantage of the inherent redundancy provided by the
coding scheme itself. This redundancy comes from the fact
that the content of each storage node corresponds to the
same data block vector. To the best of our knowledge, our
proposal is the first error detection/correction method that
does not require any new functionality at the source nodes
or at the storage nodes. The price of this property is only a
slightly increased communication overhead for the attack
detection. On the other hand, the attack recovery requires
more computational effort from the collector.
While the scheme we describe is general, we illustrate its
benefits in the context of WSNs, where requirements on
resource consumption are the most demanding. The
principles of our algorithms can be extended also for
network coding-based P2P file distribution systems, because
the algorithms and analysis do not exploit any specialties of
WSNs that would hinder their application in other storage
systems. We propose algorithms for pollution attack
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detection and also for recovery from such attacks. In order to
measure the performance of our algorithms, we calculate the
probability of success together with the complexity of the
algorithms. Two complexity measures are considered: the
computational complexity, measured in the number of SLEs
that need to be solved, and the communication complexity,
measured in the number of encoded packets that need to be
downloaded when data are retrieved from the distributed
storage system. We show the optimal communication and
computational complexity of the proposed attack detection
algorithm in the applied system model. We investigate the
attack recovery problem as well. We show an algorithmwith
very low computational complexity. We also propose a
recovery algorithm with optimal communication complex-
ity, which has also feasible computational complexity for
small to medium size practical systems. For larger systems,
we propose a recovery algorithm that makes a trade-off
between the two complexity measures. We also introduce an
extension of the recovery algorithms to reduce the false
negative error probability in the case of a strong adversary.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In
Section 2, we introduce the system model and the adversary
model. In Section 3, we describe our proposed attack
detection algorithm, together with the analysis of its error
probability and complexity. In Section 4, specific recovery
algorithms are proposed and analyzed. Section 5 gives the
extension of the recovery algorithms. In Section 6, some
related works are discussed, and finally, in Section 7, we
draw some conclusions. The appendix contains some
additional computations and results.
2 MODEL
2.1 System Model
The general model of the distributed storage systems that
we consider in this paper is taken from [4] and it is
illustrated in Fig. 1. The system consists of k source nodes, n
storage nodes, and one or more collector nodes. Note that
these are roles, and therefore, the sets of source nodes,
storage nodes, and collector nodes may overlap. Only the
collector node is assumed to be a powerful computer (base
station), while source and storage nodes may be low
capacity devices.
Each source node i generates a data blockXi and transfers
it to some randomly selected subset of the storage nodes.
Each storage node j computes a random linear combination
of all the data blocks that it receives; the result is a single
code block Yj. Formally, we can write that Yj ¼ XGj, where
X ¼ ðX1; X2; . . . ; XkÞ is the row vector of all the data blocks,
and Gj ¼ ðg1j; g2j; . . . ; gkjÞT is a column vector, the nonzero
elements of which are the random coefficients used in the
linear combination. Here, gij 2 GF ðqÞ for all i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; k
and j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n, and for some q. Each storage node j stores
the pair Zj ¼ ðGj; YjÞ, which represents the equation
Yj ¼ XGj. The entire system is represented by the SLEs
Y ¼ XG, where Y ¼ ðY1; Y2; . . . ; YnÞ is the row vector of all
code blocks, and G ¼ ðG1; G2; . . . ; GnÞ is a k n matrix that
contains the coefficient vectors in its columns. Matrix G is
also called generator matrix.
For appropriately selected values of k and q, any k k
submatrix of G is nonsingular with high probability.
According to Theorems 1 and 2 in [4], the probability of
nonsingularity is at least ð1 kqÞc2ðkÞ, where c2ðkÞ ! 1, if
k!1. Larger values of q increase the probability of
successful decoding, but make the overhead of storage
higher. [4] also shows that storage nodes required to store
Oðln kÞ coefficients. For example, if k ¼ 100 and q ¼ 220, the
probability of singularity is  104, while the average
overhead of a storage node is 92 bits. Therefore, the collector
node can reconstruct all the data blockswith high probability
by downloading the equations from any k storage nodes and
solving the obtained SLE for X. In the rest of the paper, we
assume that this property of G holds.
In fact, each data blockXi can itself be a column vector of
m symbols ðx1i; x2i; . . . ; xmiÞT, where x‘i 2 GF ðqÞ for all i ¼
1; 2; . . . ; k and ‘ ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;m. In that case, each code block
Yj is also a column vector ðy1j; y2j; . . . ; ymjÞT ofm symbols in
GF ðqÞ. The linear combination Yj ¼ XGj is computed in a
symbol-by-symbol manner, meaning that y‘j ¼
Pk
i¼1 x‘igij
for all j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n and ‘ ¼ 1; 2; . . .m. Thus, one can think
ofX and Y in the SLE Y ¼ XG as matrices of sizem k and
m n, respectively. This view is illustrated in Fig. 2.
2.2 Adversary Model
We assume that the adversary has access to t storage nodes,
and she can observe and modify the equations stored by
them. This means that if the adversary has access to storage
node j, then she can modify both Gj and Yj stored by node
j. Let G ¼ GþG and Y  ¼ Y þY be the modified
generator matrix and the modified code block vector after
an attack, where modifications made by the adversary are
contained in matrix G and vector Y . We further allow
the adversary to compromise the communication links of
the t storage nodes. It gives more possibility to the
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Fig. 1. System model.
Fig. 2. Illustration of the system of linear equations representing the
entire distributed storage system.
adversary, but does not extend the possible effect of the
attack. For simplicity, we refer to nodes that store modified
data as compromised nodes, and do not distinguish them
upon the way of modification.
Note that the adversary has no access to the source
nodes, rather she aims at compromising the output of the
storage system. The rationale behind this assumption is that
storage nodes are exposed to attacks for an extended period
of time, whereas the source nodes must be attacked during
the limited time period of data generation. Data distribution
from the source nodes to the storage nodes typically takes
place on a wireless channel, which is exposed to various
attacks. Accordingly, our applied model of adversary is
realistic in most cases.
Recall that when reconstructing the data blocks, the
collector node chooses the k storage nodes, from which it
downloads the k linear equations, randomly. Therefore, the
adversary has no information on which storage nodes will
be chosen when she performs the attack. At the same time,
the collector node does not know which storage nodes are
compromised. In the sequel, we will assume without loss of
generality that the adversary randomly chooses the t
storage nodes to be compromised, and the collector node
downloads the equations of the first k storage nodes, where
the order of the storage nodes is defined randomly by the
collector node. Thus, the set of equations downloaded by
the collector node is Z1::k ¼ ðG1::k; Y 1::kÞ, where G1::k ¼
ðG1; G2; . . . ; GkÞ and Y 1::k ¼ ðY 1 ; Y 2 ; . . . ; Y k Þ.
Let us now investigate the effect of an attack. The collector
node solves the SLEY 1::k ¼ XG1::k forX andobtains the result
X ¼ Y 1::kðG1::kÞ1. Let us suppose for the moment that the
adversary modifies only the code blocks, meaning that
G ¼ G. In this case, X ¼ Y 1::kðG1::kÞ1. The modification
induced by the attack in the decoded data blocks can be
computed as follows:
X ¼ X X
¼ Y 1::kðG1::kÞ1 X
¼ ðY1::k þY1::kÞðG1::kÞ1 X
¼ Y1::kðG1::kÞ1;
where in the last step we used that Y1::kðG1::kÞ1 ¼ X. This
means that 1) if a given row of Y1::k contains only zeros,
then the corresponding row of X will contain only zeros
too, and 2) a nonzero element in a given row of Y1::k will
affect the entire corresponding row in X. Thus, a
modification made by the adversary in a given row in any
of the first k code blocks will, in general, affect all decoded
data blocks, but the effect will be limited to the correspond-
ing row. This is illustrated on the left-hand side of Fig. 3.
Now, let us suppose that the adversary modifies only the
coefficient vectors, meaning that Y  ¼ Y . In this case,
X ¼ Y1::kðG1::kÞ1. If at least one of the first k coefficient
vectors has been modified by the adversary, then
G1::k 6¼ G1::k, and thus, ðG1::kÞ1 can be completely different
from ðG1::kÞ1. Therefore, in general, such a modification
affects all decoded data blocks in every row. This is
illustrated on the right-hand side of Fig. 3.
If the adversary modifies both the coefficient vectors and
the code blocks, then these effects are combined. In the
general case, the modification induced by the attack on the
decoded data blocks can be derived as follows:
X þX ¼ ðY1::k þY1::kÞðG1::kÞ1
ðX þXÞG1::k ¼ Y1::k þY1::k
XG1::k þXG1::k ¼ Y1::k
X ¼ ðY1::k XG1::kÞðG1::kÞ1;
where in the second step we used G1::k ¼ G1::k þG1::k and
XG1::k ¼ Y1::k.
The above formulas imply the following observation. If
Y1...k is controlled by the adversary, meaning that all
downloaded equations are from compromised nodes, the
value of X can be chosen by the adversary. The adversary
can reconstruct X from the contents of the nodes, so she is
able to enforce arbitrary X ¼ X þX solution by loading
Y i ¼ Xi Gi as the modified content of the ith compromised
storage node. As a result, the adversary can not only
destroy the original data block vectors, but she can also
enforce a particular value. This scenario may occur, if t  k.
Actually, these observations illustrate the amplification
effect of the pollution attack: a small amount of modifica-
tions in the stored coded information can result in a large
amount of modifications in the decoded data. In the worst
case, all data blocks are entirely destroyed. This is highly
undesirable, and requires the development of some counter-
measures. Below, we address this problem by proposing
mechanisms to detect and recover from such attacks.
3 ATTACK DETECTION
3.1 Principle
The basic idea of our attack detection mechanism is the
following: In most cases, the adversary cannot enforce a
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Fig. 3. Effects of the pollution attack on the decoded data blocks.
particular solution X ¼ Y 1::kðG1::kÞ1, because it is unlikely
that she compromises all the first k equations (the
probability of this event is
t
kð Þ
n
kð Þ  ðt=nÞ
k). In most of the
cases, X can be treated as a random vector, except if all
the first k equations are intact, in which case X ¼ X will
hold. As we will see from the analysis, if X 6¼ X, X takes
its values randomly form a set of size at least q.
Now, suppose that we have an additional intact
equation: Ykþ1 ¼ XGkþ1 (i.e., the collector downloaded
Zkþ1 ¼ ðGkþ1; Ykþ1ÞÞ. If X is random or it is chosen by the
adversary, then it will not satisfy the additional intact
equation with high probability, while it will satisfy it with
probability 1 if X ¼ X. Thus, we can detect if the decoded
data block vector X is polluted with the help of an
additional intact equation.
In the rest of this section, we develop an attack detection
algorithm based on the principle described above, and we
analyze it in a more rigorous way.
3.2 Algorithm
The proposed attack detection algorithm works in the
following way: The collector downloads the first k equations
Z1::k and computes X
 ¼ Y 1::kðG1::kÞ1. Then, the collector
downloads the next equation Zkþ1. If Y

kþ1 ¼ XGkþ1, then no
attack is detected (and the collector acceptsX as the correct
solution). Otherwise, if Y kþ1 6¼ XGkþ1, an attack is signaled.
3.3 Analysis
In this section, we investigate the complexity of the attack
detection algorithm, as well as its false negative and false
positive error probabilities.
3.3.1 Complexity
We measure the communication complexity in the number
of downloaded equations. This measure is a property of the
algorithm independent of the network topology, however,
describes well the amount of communication required. The
amount of traffic that loads the network in reality, highly
depends on the topology and routing. The computational
complexity is in the number of SLEs that the collector needs
to solve. Again, this is an abstract measure that describes
the algorithms. The amount of required computation
depends on the size of the system. We can expect that an
SLE can be solved in Oðk2:5Þ steps. For recovery, we
introduce an acceleration that makes this computation
faster. For simplicity, we do not consider the method of
solving SLEs when describing the algorithms, and complex-
ity refers only the number of solved SLEs.
The communication complexity of the proposed attack
detection algorithm is hence kþ 1, and its computational
complexity is 1. According to Lemma 1, any attack detection
algorithm that operates in the described system needs at
least kþ 1 equations to download, hence, the attack
detection is optimal in terms of communication complexity.
Lemma 1. In the described system model, any attack detection
algorithm uses at least kþ 1 downloaded equations.
Proof. When a node downloads k0 equations, the obtained
matrix G1...k0 determines a ðk0; kÞ linear code for the data
block vectors, where Y 1...k0 is the coded block vector. An
attacked encoded block can be seen as an erroneous
block. Note that the case when not only the coded block,
but the encoding vector is also modified, can be treated
as if only the encoded block was modified, because each
encoding vector is valid, thus it has a corresponding
correct encoded block.
It is known that the Hamming distance of any error
detection code is at least 2. In our case, k0 determines the
Hamming distance of the code. If k0 < k, the Hamming
distance is 0 because the SLE has many solutions; thus,
many data block vectors have the same encoded vector.
When k0 ¼ k, the Hamming distance of the code is 1,
because each encoded block is valid and has exactly one
corresponding data block vector. This is sufficient for
decoding, but not for error detection. It means that attack
detection is not possible with less than kþ 1 equations. If
k0 ¼ kþ 1, the Hamming distance reaches 2, because the
last coded block is determined by the first k blocks, thus
error detection becomes possible. tu
3.3.2 Probability of a False Negative Decision
Wedistinguish two cases: eitherX can be taken as a random
value, or it is controlled by the adversary. First, we assume
that either out of the first k downloaded equation at least one
equation is intact, or the adversarymodified the content of the
storage nodes independently; thus, X can be taken as a
random value. Let us assume for the moment that the
adversary does not modify the coefficient vectors, meaning
that G ¼ G. As we saw earlier, in this case, the collector
obtains the solutionX ¼ X þY1::kG11::k ¼ X þX.
If we further assume that the additional equation that we
use for detection is intact, then we have Zkþ1 ¼ Zkþ1 ¼
ðGkþ1; Ykþ1Þ. In this case, the false negative error probability,
denoted by Pfneg, can be computed as follows:
Pfneg ¼ PrfYkþ1 ¼ XGkþ1jY1::k 6¼ 0g
¼ PrfYkþ1 ¼ ðX þXÞGkþ1jY1::k 6¼ 0g
¼ PrfXGkþ1 ¼ 0jY1::k 6¼ 0g;
ð1Þ
where in the last step we used Ykþ1 ¼ XGkþ1.
Recall from the left-hand side of Fig. 3 that if Y1::k has a
nonzero element in the ith row (and G1::k is intact), then X
also has some nonzero elements in the ith row. Otherwise, if
the ith row of Y1::k contains only zeros, then the ith row of
X contains only zeros too.
We can write the ith element of XGkþ1 as
Xk
‘¼1
xi‘g‘ðkþ1Þ: ð2Þ
By the argument above, (2) is a nontrivial linear combina-
tion of the elements of Gkþ1. However, the elements of
Gkþ1 are chosen randomly, and due to the random order
of downloads these values are not known to the adversary
in advance, therefore, the probability of (2) being 0 is equal
to 1=q.
If elements of X are independent,
Pfneg ¼ 1
qt0
; ð3Þ
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where t0 is the number of rows in Y1::k that contains
nonzero elements. When the modifications are dependent,
Pfneg  1=q is still true. From this, it follows that X takes its
value randomly from a set of size at least q. Clearly, in order
to maximize the error probability (and hence minimize the
success probability) of the detection, the adversary must
make all modifications to the code blocks in a single row or
make the modifications of rows linearly dependent.
Next, we keep the assumption that the adversary does not
modify the coefficient vectors (hence, G ¼ G), but we
assume that the code block of the additional equation that
we use for detection is attacked, meaning that Zkþ1 ¼ ðGkþ1;
Y kþ1Þ ¼ ðGkþ1; Ykþ1 þYkþ1Þ. In this case, a simplederivation
similar to the previous case can be used to arrive to the
following result:
Pfneg ¼ PrfXGkþ1 ¼ Ykþ1jY1::k 6¼ 0g: ð4Þ
Recall from the previous discussion that the ith row of
X contains only zeros if the ith row of Y1::k contains only
zeros. In this case, the ith element ofXGkþ1 must be a zero
too. Thus, if the ith element in Ykþ1 is not zero, then the
above error probability is 0 (i.e., we can detect the attack
even though the additional equation used for detection is
not intact). On the other hand, if Ykþ1 contains zeros in
every row, where Y1::k contains only zeros, then due to the
randomness of Gkþ1, we get again that Pfneg  1=q.
Finally, let us consider the general case when the
adversary may modify both the coefficient vectors and the
code blocks, hence G 6¼ 0 and Y 6¼ 0. This case has to be
handled carefully, because X ¼ Y 1::kðG1::kÞ1 might be not
completely random. For example, if Y1::k ¼ XG1::k then,
although G1::k 6¼ 0 and Y1::k 6¼ 0 can hold, X ¼ 0. Of
course, this modification cannot be treated as an attack,
because the modified equation is not polluted. This example
is to point out that even if all elements of the coefficient vector
and the encoded block are modified, it may be equivalent to
an intact equation with a single modified element. Thus, if
we consider the highest possible dependency between
modified elements, we get back to the previous case, and
Pfneg ¼ PrfY kþ1 ¼ XGkþ1jG1::k 6¼ 0g 
1
q
ð5Þ
holds for this case also. In the case of a random adversary,
all values of X may be independently random, and hence,
this probability falls to 1=qm.
The conclusion of this analysis is that when not all
downloaded equations belong to the sameX 6¼ X value, the
maximum value of a false negative detection is Pfneg ¼ 1=q.
Hence, if q is chosen sufficiently large, then the probability of
not detecting a pollution attack is negligible. Of course, a
larger value of q introduces larger overhead in communica-
tion and storage also. Note that if the code blocks contain
standard error detection elements, such as a CRC checksum,
then at least two rows must be changed presumably
independently by the adversary in every attacked code
block. Consequently, in that case, we have that Pfneg  1=q2.
This observation allows to choose smaller fields, and hence,
to make the computations over the Galois field faster. Recall
from the system model that, e.g., q ¼ 220 is realistic that
indicates an error probability 240.
Now, we consider the case when all kþ 1 downloaded
equations are polluted and X is chosen by the adversary.
In this case, the attack detection algorithm does not signal
an attack, because X satisfies the polluted testing equation
also. This is clearly a false negative decision. The probability
of this case is
 ¼
t
kþ1
 
n
kþ1
   ðt=nÞkþ1:
When t is not very large compared to n, and k is large
enough, this value is very small (e.g., when n ¼ 100, k ¼ 10,
t ¼ 20,   109). Hence, we can estimate the upper bound
of a false negative decision with:
Pfneg < 1=q þ:
Beside k, the value of  depends on the number of
compromised nodes. In most cases, it is reasonable to
assume that n	 t, and so  is close to 0. However, if we
consider a strong adversary and large values of t,  may
become not negligible. In Section 5, we give a method to
eliminate the effect of .
3.3.3 Probability of a False Positive Decision
Let us close this sectionwith the analysis of the probability of
a false positive decision. For this, let us assume that the first k
equations downloaded by the collector node are intact,
meaning that Z1::k ¼ Z1::k. Thus, the collector computes the
correct solutionX ¼ Y 1::kðG1::kÞ1 ¼ Y1::kðG1::kÞ1 ¼ X. If the
additional equation downloaded for attack detection is also
intact (i.e., Zkþ1 ¼ Zkþ1), then no attack is detected as
Y kþ1 ¼ Ykþ1 ¼ XGkþ1 ¼ XGkþ1. Thus, an attack may be
signaled only in the case when the additional equation is
not intact. From this, a good approximation of the probability
of a false positive decision, denoted by Pfpos, is the following:
Pfpos  PrfZkþ1 6¼ 0jZ1::k ¼ 0g: ð6Þ
Given that the first k equations are intact, the probability
that the ðkþ 1Þth equation is also intact is
nk1
t
 
nk
t
  ¼ n k t
n k ; ð7Þ
where t is the number of randomly chosen storage nodes
that are attacked by the adversary. From this, we get
Pfpos ¼ 1 n k t
n k ¼
t
n k : ð8Þ
While Pfpos is not negligible, false positive decisions do
not have serious effects. Indeed, when the attack detection
algorithm signals an attack, the recovery procedures
described in the next section are executed. These procedures
try to recover the original data block vector, and as we will
see, they succeed in a few steps when the number of
attacked equations is small (which is true by definition in
case of a false positive decision of the attack detection
algorithm).
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4 RECOVERY FROM ATTACK
Based on the same principle as the attack detection, we give
recovery algorithms as well. These algorithms use the attack
detection algorithm as a building block. The task of the
recovery algorithm is to find a kþ 1 size set of intact
equations, given the attack detection algorithm. With less
than kþ 1 intact equations, successful recovery is theoreti-
cally impossible, because k intact equations are needed to
obtain the correct data block vector and an additional intact
equation is needed to verify the solution. The attack
detection is assumed to always give correct result, because
q can be chosen sufficiently large and  is negligible. Later
in Section 5, we investigate cases when this assumption is
too strong, i.e., when the attacker is strong enough to
compromise a large portion of the storage nodes.
In other words, the attack detection algorithm gives for
any kþ 1 size set whether it contains some polluted
equations or not. If an attack is signaled, we only know
that there are some polluted equations in the set, but do not
know how many and which ones. Therefore, the system can
be modeled as Z ¼ ð nkþ1Þ sets out of which z ¼ ðntkþ1Þ is intact
and we need to find one of the intact sets.
In the following three sections we propose three specific
algorithms for the recovery problem. The first two of them
have optimal success probability, meaning that if recovery
is possible, they eventually succeed. Table 1 summarizes the
main properties of our algorithms, while Fig. 4 illustrates
the qualitative properties of the algorithms for two
representative systems, a small and a large one, having
ðn; k; tÞ 2 fð100; 10; 40Þ; ð1; 000; 100; 80Þg2. This figure gives
an overview of the algorithms, while we give the detailed
analysis of each later. In computational complexity Algo-
rithm 0 is near to the optimum, but has high communica-
tion complexity. On the contrary, Algorithm 1 has the
theoretical optimum with respect to communication com-
plexity, but has unfeasibly large computational load for a
large system. Our third algorithm gives up the optimality of
success probability to fit for large systems in complexity.
4.1 Algorithm 0
4.1.1 Description
Let us choose randomly a kþ 1 size set out of the n
equations of the system. Let S be the first k element in this
set. Run the attack detection algorithm on set S with the
remaining equation as the testing equation. If no attack is
signaled, S is clear. Otherwise, restart the algorithm with a
different randomly chosen set.
4.1.2 Computational Complexity
The algorithm tests the Z ¼ ð nkþ1Þ sets until it finds one of the
z ¼ ðntkþ1Þ intact sets. The expected value of the computational
complexity of Algorithm 0 is, hence, Zþ1zþ1 ¼
ð nkþ1Þþ1
ðntkþ1Þþ1
. Fig. 5
shows the average computational complexity as the function
of the number of attacked equations in the system for some
selected values of n and k. The figure clearly indicates the
exponential complexity, but also shows that in practice the
range of usability is quite wide, for n ¼ 100 nodes and
k ¼ 10, if 70 percent of the nodes are attacked, the complexity
is still below 107, and in a 10 times larger system ðn ¼ 1;000;
k ¼ 100Þ, with the same complexity still more then 15 percent
of the nodes can be attacked. Furthermore, there are reasons
to assume that the exponential complexity cannot be avoided
in this system model. Our conjecture is as follows: Having
n equations, fixed k value and an unknown number t of attacked
equations in the system, if any algorithm provides optimal success
probability, the lowest average computational complexity it may
have is exponential in t.
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Fig. 4. Comparison of the three recovery algorithms—the left-hand-side
group belongs to n ¼ 100, the right-hand-side group belongs to
n ¼ 1;000.
TABLE 1
Main Properties of the Proposed Recovery Algorithms
Fig. 5. Average computational complexity of Algorithm 0.
2. Algorithm 2 has a further parameter max, we introduce later, we set
max ¼ 4 in the figure. Although, the success probability of Algorithm 2 is
not optimal, we will see later that for these values this hardly makes sense.
4.1.3 Communication Complexity
The following approximation is used to estimate the
communication complexity of Algorithm 0. In each iteration
the probability that a given equation is selected is kþ1n , as
kþ 1 equations are selected randomly out of the n
equations. This consideration holds if the same SLE is
allowed to be selected multiple times (if the selection of the
iterations is independent). Our approximation is good for
Algorithm 0, if Z 
 Zþ1zþ1 . This holds for the typical
parameters in practice. Accordingly, the system is treated
as n independent random variable having geometric
distribution with parameter kþ1n . The jth equation is
downloaded in the ith iteration, if the value of the jth
variable equals i. From the geometric distribution it follows
that after the ith iteration of the algorithm, the expected
number of downloaded equations is
n
Xi
!¼1
1 kþ 1
n
 !1 kþ 1
n
 
:
The expected value of the communication complexity is the
weighted average of these values with the probability that
Algorithm 0 stops in the ith iteration as weights. The
success probability of Algorithm 0 can be estimated with zZ
in each iteration, thus, it succeeds in the ith iteration with
probability ð1 zZÞi1 zZ . Again, we model the iterations as
independent selections of sets. As a result, the estimated
communication complexity of Algorithm 0 is
n
z
Z
X1
i¼0
1 z
Z
 i1Xi
j¼1
1 kþ 1
n
 i1 kþ 1
n
 
:
The complexity increases rapidly with the number of
attacked equations. Fig. 4 already showed the high
complexity of this algorithm. This is the main drawback
of Algorithm 0, because in sensor networks it is important
to minimize communication complexity. In the following
we present Algorithm 1 that has optimal communication
complexity.
4.2 Algorithm 1
4.2.1 Principle
The following two recovery algorithms are both based on
the same principle. When the collector node detects that the
originally downloaded set S ¼ Z1::k of equations is polluted,
it can download more equations and use them to clean the
polluted set S. The basic idea of cleaning is the following: Let
us denote the set of equations downloaded for cleaning by
C, and let e be an additional equation. We use the equations
in C to replace a subset of size jCj of the equations in S. We
denote the resulting new set of equations by S0. Then, we
run our attack detection mechanism on S0 with equation e
used for testing. In other words, we solve the SLE
corresponding to S0 and check if the solution satisfies
equation e. If no attack is detected, then we accept the
obtained solution as the correct data block vector. Other-
wise, we take S again, replace another subset of size jCj of its
equations, and run the attack detection again. We repeat
these steps until either the cleaning succeeds or all possible
subsets of size jCj of set S have been replaced.
Note that if e is intact, C contains only intact equations,
and the number of the attacked equations in S is not greater
than jCj, then the above described procedure eventually
succeeds, because we will eventually replace all the
attacked equations in S by the intact equations in C. In
case of failure, either e is attacked, or C contains an attacked
equation, or the number of attacked equations in S is
greater than jCj. In this case, we may download another set
C0 of equations such that jC0j > jCj, as well as another
testing equation e0, and try the cleaning of S again.
In the rest of this section, we propose two specific
recovery algorithms based on this principle. As we will see,
the first algorithm is optimized for communication com-
plexity, however, its computational complexity does not
scale well with k. Nevertheless, it is still usable for many
practical systems. The second algorithm that we propose
has improved computational complexity; however, in
general, it has a higher communication complexity than
the first algorithm has, and it can recover only from attacks
where the number of the compromised storage nodes is
limited. We deliberately do not give more precise state-
ments about the performance of our algorithms at this
point. We analyze them and describe the trade-off that they
offer in more details below.
4.2.2 Description
The basic idea of our Algorithm 1 is to start the cleaning
with a cleaning set C of size one (i.e., to assume first that
there is only one attacked equation in set S), and then, if
cleaning fails, to increase the size of C iteratively. In this
way, sooner or later, we arrive to a cleaning set C that
contains as many intact equations as the number of attacked
equations in S. In each iteration, we select all possible
subsets of the equations in C and replace with them all
possible subsets of equations in S. Thus, eventually, we
replace the attacked equations with the intact ones, and
arrive to a clean set.
Below, we first formalize the operation of the algorithm,
then analyze its success probability and complexity.
The pseudocode of the algorithm is presented in Table 2.
Its operation is explained as follows: The algorithm first
downloads Z1::kþ1 (line 1) and runs the attack detection
algorithm on Z1::k using Z

kþ1 as the testing equation (line
2). If no attack is detected, then Z1::k is clean and the
algorithm stops (line 3). Otherwise, the algorithm starts
the cleaning of S ¼ Z1::k (lines 5-24). This is an iterative
process, where in each iteration (lines 7-24), exactly one
new equation is downloaded (line 8). The newly down-
loaded equation, denoted by e, becomes the testing
equation used for attack detection in the current iteration
(line 10). The rest of the equations downloaded so far, not
counting the equations in S, constitute the cleaning set
denoted by C (line 9). The algorithm takes every possible
subset C0 of C, such that jC0j ¼  is not greater than k (lines
12-13), and uses the equations in C0 to replace  equations
in S in all possible ways (lines 14-16). After each
replacement, the attack detection mechanism is executed
on the resulting set S0 of equations using e as the testing
equation (line 17). If no attack is detected, then S0 is clean
and the algorithm stops (line 18).
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4.2.3 Success Probability
It is easy to see that the algorithm succeeds iff the number t0
of the attacked equations in S ¼ Z1::k is smaller than the
number of the intact equations in the remaining set Zkþ1::n.
On the one hand, if this condition holds, then we have at
least t0 þ 1 intact equations in Zkþ1::n, and therefore, as we
continue downloading more and more equations for
cleaning, we eventually reach a state where the cleaning
set C contains at least t0 intact equations and the last
downloaded equation e used for attack detection is also
intact. In this case, eventually, all the attacked equations in
S will be replaced by intact equations from C, hence S will
be cleaned. In addition, as e is intact, the attack detection
mechanism will indicate no attack, and we can actually
realize that S is cleaned.
On the other hand, if t0 is not smaller than the number of
the intact equations in Zkþ1::n, then either the cleaning set C
contains fewer than t0 intact equations, and hence, S cannot
be cleaned, or C contains exactly t0 intact equations and S
can be cleaned, but we have no more intact equation for
attack detection purposes, and therefore, we cannot realize
that S is cleaned.
Given that there are t attacked equations all together, and
t0 of them are in Z1::k, we get that the number of intact
equations in Zkþ1::n is ðn kÞ  ðt t0Þ. Hence, the algo-
rithm succeeds iff t0 < ðn kÞ  ðt t0Þ, or equivalently,
t < n k. Thus, we get
Psuccess ¼ 1; if t < n k0; otherwise:

ð9Þ
Note that if t  n k then it is theoretically impossible to
recover from an attack, hence, our algorithm is optimal with
respect to success probability.
4.2.4 Communication Complexity
Recall that we measure the communication complexity in
the number of the downloaded equations. As the algorithm
downloads a new equation in every iteration, its commu-
nication complexity depends on the number of the iterations
it performs. More precisely, if the algorithm performs R
iterations, then its communication complexity is ðkþ 1Þ þR,
because it downloads kþ 1 equations at the beginning
before the iterative phase is started. As k is a fixed
parameter, we are interested in the characterization of R.
The algorithm stops as soon as the following two
conditions hold: (see Fig. 6 for illustration): 1) the number
of intact equations in the cleaning set C is equal to the
number of attacked equations in S, and 2) the last
downloaded equation e used for attack detection is intact.
Indeed, if condition 1) is satisfied, then eventually the intact
equations in C will be used to replace the attacked
equations in S, hence, S will be cleaned. If, in addition,
condition 2) is satisfied, then the attack detection mechan-
ism will indicate no attack, and we can actually realize that
S is cleaned. Thus, R is the number of equations needed to
be downloaded to satisfy the two conditions above.
It must be clear that if S contains t0 attacked equations,
then C [ feg must contain at least t0 þ 1 intact equations, as
otherwise, we cannot clean S and realize that it has been
cleaned at the same time. Thus, R is minimal in the sense
that for R0 < R downloaded equations, C [ feg contains
fewer than t0 þ 1 intact equations, and hence, the algorithm
cannot succeed. This means that our algorithm is optimal in
terms of communication complexity.
We give an estimation of R in the following way. Let
p ¼ t=n, and let W1 denote the number of equations that
need to be downloaded so that the downloaded set of
equations contain exactly the same number of intact
equations, on average, as the number of attacked equations
in S. The average number of attacked equations in set S is
approximately kp. The average number of intact equations
among the W1 equations is approximately W1ð1 pÞ.
Hence, we get that W1  kp=ð1 pÞ. Furthermore, let W2
denote the average number of equations that need to be
downloaded until we download an intact equation. Clearly,
W2  1=ð1 pÞ. Thus, when W1 þW2 equations are down-
loaded, both conditions 1) and 2) are satisfied. In other
words, a good estimate of R is
R W1 þW2  kpþ 1
1 p : ð10Þ
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TABLE 2
Pseudocode of Algorithm 1
Fig. 6. Illustration of the stop condition of Algorithm 1.
4.2.5 Computational Complexity
Recall that we measure the computational complexity in the
number of SLEs that need to be solved. In our case, each call to
the attackdetection algorithm requires the solution of an SLE.
The worst case computational complexity Pworst of the
algorithm can be easily determined by inspecting the
structure of the nested loops in the algorithm:
Pworst 
XR
w¼1
Xminðw;kÞ
¼0
w

  k

 
; ð11Þ
where R is the number of iterations, which we can estimate
according to (10).
For the derivation of the average case computational
complexity avg, we assume that the number of the attacked
equations in S is t0, where the average value of t0 is kt=n. We
make the following observations:
. All but the last iterations of the algorithm execute
fully (term (12) in the sum below).
. In the last iteration, the loops that try to clean S with
 < t0 equations from C also execute fully (term (13)
in the sum below).
. When we use  ¼ t0 equations from C for cleaning,
we have to process on average half of the possible
selections of t0 equations from C until we end up
with the subset that contains the t0 intact equations
of C. For all those selections, the inner loop executes
fully and we must process all the possible selections
of t0 equations from S (term (14) in the sum below).
. Finally, when we select the subset of C that contains
the t0 intact equations, we have to process on average
half of the possible selections of t0 equations from S
until we end up with the t0 attacked equations of S
(term (15) in the sum below).
Thus, we get that
avg 
XR1
w¼1
Xminðw;kÞ
¼0
w

  k

 
þ ð12Þ
Xt01
¼0
R

 
k

 
þ ð13Þ
1
2
R
t0
 
k
t0
 
þ ð14Þ
1
2
k
t0
 
: ð15Þ
Fig. 7 shows the average computational complexity of
Algorithm 1 as a function of the number t of attacked
equations. The different curves belong to different values of
n and k, and the computation is based on the formula given
above. For comparison the corresponding average computa-
tional complexity of Algorithm 0 is also drawn with dashed
line. Clearly, the price of the optimality of the communica-
tion complexity is the increased computational complexity.
As we can see, the computational complexity of Algo-
rithm 1 increases rapidly with the number t of attacked
equations. Still, for the presented values of n, k, and t, it
does not exceed 109  230, which is still feasible. Thus, for
systems, where k is in the range of 10-50, Algorithm 1
provides a practical solution: it succeeds in recovering from
attacks even if the number t of the attacked equations is
very large, its communication complexity is optimal, and it
is still computationally feasible up to t  55 attacked
equations. Note that the case of n ¼ 100, t  55 means that
more than half of the storage nodes are compromised, yet
Algorithm 1 can recover from the attack and it is practically
feasible. In the case of n ¼ 500, Algorithm 1 can cope only
with a weaker attacker that can compromise around
10 percent of the storage nodes.
Note that the algorithm requires solving a series of SLEs
that differ only in a few equations. This property can be
exploited to accelerate the solution of the SLEs. For details,
we refer the reader to Appendix C.
Due to the computational complexity Algorithm 1 is not
practical for very large systems with an attacker of
considerable strength. Below we present Algorithm 2,
which gives a trade-off between success probability,
communication complexity, and computational complexity,
and thus, fits for very large systems as well.
4.3 Algorithm 2
4.3.1 Description
Our second algorithm applies the same principles, but
contrary to Algorithm 1, where the size of the cleaning set is
iteratively increased, it uses a fixed size cleaning set C. In
this way, the number of the possible selections of the
different subsets of C does not grow, and hence, the
computational complexity of the algorithm scales better
with k. Instead of iteratively increasing C, this algorithm
changes the fixed size sets S and C in each iteration. In
effect, S and C consist of the equations that are taken from a
fixed size window that slides over Z. As a result, the
success probability of this algorithm does not equal 1 in all
cases. The recovery is successful if S contains not more
attacked equations than max, where max is an input
parameter that limits the computational complexity of the
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Fig. 7. Average computational complexity of Algorithm 1 with compar-
ison to Algorithm 0, as a function of the number t of attacked equations.
The different curves belong to different values of n and k.
algorithm by limiting the size of the subsets of the equations
that we choose from C and replace in S.
The pseudocode of the algorithm is presented in Table 3.
First, we download the equations Z1::kþ1 and perform attack
detection in a way similar to Algorithm 1 (lines 1-4). If no
attack is detected, then the algorithm stops; otherwise, we
start an iterative cleaning process (lines 5-26). As we said
above, in this algorithm, the size w of the cleaning set C is a
fixed value dke (line 5), where  is an input parameter. We
download the equations Zkþ2::kþw (line 6), and initialize the
set S to be cleaned with Z1::k and the cleaning set C with
Zkþ1::kþw. Both sets change in each iteration, and we use
variables iS and iC to point to the first equations of them in
the current iteration. Similarly, ie points to the equation that
we use in attack detection for testing. Variables iS , iC , and ie
are initialized (line 7) and the iteration starts. In each
iteration (lines 8-26), we download exactly one new
equation (line 9), which becomes the equation that is used
as the testing equation in attack detection (line 12). The
algorithm takes every possible subset C0 of C, such that
jC0j ¼  is not greater than max (lines 13-15), and uses the
equations in C0 to replace  equations in S in all possible
ways (lines 16-18). After each replacement, the attack
detection mechanism is executed on the resulting set S0 of
equations using e as the testing equation (line 19). If no
attack is detected, then S0 is clean and the algorithm stops
(line 20). Otherwise, we increment each of our pointers iS ,
iC , and ie (line 25), and continue the iteration. Note that set
S [ C [ feg consists of the equations in a sliding window of
size kþ wþ 1 that slides over Z until either cleaning is
successful or we downloaded all equations in Z.
4.3.2 Analysis by Simulations
Algorithm 2 is more difficult to examine analytically, there-
fore, we used simulations, written in Matlab, to investigate
its performance. The simulation settings are detailed in
Appendix A.
We are interested in the success probability of the
algorithm, which we estimate as the fraction of the
simulation runs, for a given setting of the parameters,
where the algorithm succeeds. In addition, we are inter-
ested in the average communication and computational
complexity of the algorithm, which we obtain as the mean
of the communication and computational complexities,
respectively, of the simulation runs for a given setting of
the parameters.
4.3.3 Success Probability
Fig. 8 shows the success probability of Algorithm 2 as the
function of the number t of the attacked equations. The
different curves belong to different values of max.
As we can see, the success probability of the algorithm is
larger than 90 percent until a threshold value of t, and
begins to decrease rapidly after the threshold. This thresh-
old value is approximately t ¼ 85, t ¼ 100, and t ¼ 110, for
max ¼ 4, max ¼ 5, and max ¼ 6, respectively. Thus, as we
expected, if we increase max, the algorithm ensures
recovery from stronger attacks that involve more attacked
equations. On the other hand, as we will see below, the
computational complexity increases too.
Recall that in case of Algorithm 1, the success probability
remained one until the threshold t ¼ n k 1, which
would be t ¼ 899 for n ¼ 1;000 and k ¼ 100. This threshold
is much larger than the threshold values that we got for
Algorithm 2. Despite of this, the threshold values that we
obtained are still surprisingly large given that the algorithm
is prepared to handle much smaller number of attacked
equations. Indeed, when max ¼ 4, the algorithm is pre-
pared to clean four attacked equations in a set of size
k ¼ 100, which means 40 attacked equations in the entire set
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TABLE 3
Pseudocode of Algorithm 2
Fig. 8. Success rate of Algorithm 2 as a function of the number t of
attacked equations. n ¼ 1;000 and k ¼ 100.
of size n ¼ 1;000. However, the algorithm succeeds with
high probability even if the number of attacked equations is
around 85. A similar observation can be made for the other
values of max.
The reason of this is that when t ¼ 85, the average
number of attacked equations in a set of size k ¼ 100 is 8.5,
but this means that there are sets with a smaller number of
attacked equations. Apparently, we can find a set with not
more than four attacked equations with a rather high
probability among the sets that we obtain by sliding a
window of size k ¼ 100 over the entire set Z of equations.
A similar argument applies for the other cases.
4.3.4 Communication Complexity
Fig. 9 shows the average communication complexity (i.e., the
number of the downloaded equations) of Algorithm 2. We
truncated the plot at t ¼ 120, because above that value, the
success probability of the algorithm is rather poor anyway;
hence, we are not really interested in its complexity.
As we expected, the average communication complexity
increases as the number t of the attacked equations
increases, because it becomes more difficult to find, at the
same time, a set S of k equations that contains no more than
a fixed max attacked equations, and a set C of k equations
that contains at least max intact equations. However, on
average, the number of the downloaded equations is
smaller than half of the total number n of equations, and
the standard deviation is also acceptably small. In parti-
cular, when the number t of attacked equations is around 50
(i.e., only 5 percent of the storage nodes are compromised),
the communication overhead is very small.
We can also observe that the communication complexity
increases as max decreases. As we will see below, the price
of this decrease is the substantially increased computational
complexity.
4.3.5 Computational Complexity
Fig. 10 shows the computational complexity (i.e., the
number of SLEs that need to be solved) of Algorithm 2 as
a function of the number t of attacked equations. The
different curves belong to different values of max.
We can observe that the computational complexity
increases quickly as the number of the attacked equations t
increases, as well as with the increase of max. Indeed,
incrementing max by one results, roughly, in an order of
magnitude more computations. The best trade-off seems to
be the max ¼ 4 case, where Algorithm 2 can handle up to
t ¼ 30 attacked equations (i.e., up to 3 percent of the total
number of equations) with a very low communication
overhead, and still reasonable computational complexity
(108  226 SLEs to solve). For a more detailed estimation see
Appendix C.
5 EXTENDED RECOVERY ALGORITHM
In the previous section, we assumed that the attack detection
always gives correct result. Nowwe consider the case, when
the adversary compromises a large portion of the storage
nodes and wants to enforce a particular X value. In this
case, the attack detection algorithm signals no attack if the
first kþ 1 equations are either all intact or all polluted, in
other words, the false negative error probability of the attack
detectionmay not be negligible due to the increased value.
We keep the assumption that the size q of the Galois field is
chosen sufficiently large. If the collector finds a seemingly
clean set of k equations (possibly as a result of the recovery
algorithm), it cannot be sure, whether the obtained solution
is the correct solutionX or it is a modified oneX, chosen by
the adversary. Without further investigations, the collector
accepts an incorrect solution with probability
Perror ¼
t
kþ1
 
nt
kþ1
 
þ tkþ1
  :
This probability is close to 0 in most practical cases,
however, it depends on t that is out of our control. In the
following, we present an algorithm for attack recovery that
eliminates this error probability. In the sequel, we assume
t < n=2, because successful recovery from the attack is
possible if and only if t < n=2. If t  n=2, it cannot be
decided which set of nodes is compromised, i.e., whetherX
is the correct solution or it was enforced by the adversary.
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Fig. 9. Average communication complexity of Algorithm 2 as a function
of the number t of attacked equations. n ¼ 1;000 and k ¼ 100.
Fig. 10. Average computational complexity of Algorithm 2 as a function
of the number t of attacked equations. n ¼ 1;000 and k ¼ 100.
The algorithm exploits the property that it is only the correct
data block vector X that satisfies at least n=2 equations.
5.1 Algorithm E
5.1.1 Principle
If a set S of size k and an additional equation e are found,
for which the presented attack detection algorithm does
not signal an attack, we can assume that the correspond-
ing solution is either the correct data block vector X or it
is a vector X enforced by adversary. We can make a
decision based on the number of further equations that
this solution satisfies.
5.1.2 Description
The operation of Algorithm E is the following: First, it finds
S and e with the help of one of the recovery algorithms
presented in the previous section. Let X be the solution of
the SLE formed by the equations in S. A counter  ¼ kþ 1 is
set. Then, it chooses an equation e0 62 S [ feg, if X satisfies
e0, increase the counter by one. The last step is repeated
until  exceeds n=2 or all possible equations are processed.
In the former case X ¼ X, that is, the correct solution is
found, and the algorithm stops. Otherwise, all equations,
including e and the elements of S, that X satisfied are
ignored, and the algorithm is repeated on the remaining
smaller set of equations.
5.1.3 Communication Complexity
The theoretical lower limit of the communication complex-
ity is downloading bn2 þ 1c equations. Algorithm E reaches
this limit if none of the first bn2 þ 1c downloaded equations is
polluted. In other cases, the communication complexity
depends on the applied algorithm for finding e and S.
5.1.4 Computational Complexity
The computational complexity of the algorithm is strongly
determined by the applied algorithm to find e and S. Notice
that the probability that S and e are not clean, that is, they
will be ignored and the algorithm finds another e and S, is
below 0.5, because at least ðbn2þ1c
kþ1 Þ clean sets exist, while the
adversary may compromise at most ðdn21e
kþ1 Þ sets that make
the attack detection algorithm to give a false negative result.
In the next iteration, the probability that S provides the
correct solution further increases, while the effort needed to
find S and e falls, because the number of attacked equations
in the system was decreased by at least kþ 1. Conse-
quently, the average number of iterations of the algorithm
is below two in all cases. The exact formulas are given in
Appendix B.
Considering that at least n=2 equations need to be
downloaded anyway, the large communication complexity
cannot be avoided. As Algorithm 0 provides the lowest
average computational complexity, it is a reasonable choice
to use Algorithm 0 for finding S and e. For this reason, we
evaluated the overall computational complexity of Algo-
rithm E, assuming Algorithm 0 is used. We compared the
computational complexity with Algorithm 0. The difference
was found to be below 1 percent in all investigated cases
(ðn; kÞ 2 fð100; 10Þ; ð500; 50Þ; ð600; 50Þ; ð1; 000; 100Þg). Conse-
quently, this kind of recovery, that allows to reduce the error
probability of the recovery algorithms to 0, requires only a
slightly more computational effort than the basic versions.
6 RELATED WORK
An algorithm to detect errors in communication systems
based on network coding principles is presented in [9]. In
that algorithm, a hash value is appended to each data
packet. It is assumed that the destination node receives at
least one or more unmodified packets and checks the
inconsistency of the decoded packets using the appended
hash values.
One important result for correcting errors introduced by
a Byzantine adversary in network coding-based commu-
nication systems is presented in [10]. In that paper, the
authors introduce an information-theoretically rate optimal
code. The packets from the adversarial nodes are intuitively
considered as packets coming from a second source, and
the packets arriving at the destination are linear combina-
tions of the source’s batch of packets and the adversary’s
batch of packets. Linear independence is assumed within
and between these batches. The destination node is
assumed to receive all the packets destined to it, and then,
it tries to distill out the original data packets from the
polluted set of packets. Compared to these works, we do
not assume any encoding of packets at the source nodes. In
addition, in distributed storage systems, we do not down-
load all the available packets. Rather, our algorithms try to
download packets only until the original data packets can
be reconstructed.
Due to the distributed source classical error correction
codes (such as Reed-Solomon codes) are also not appro-
priate; furthermore, unlike our solution, they require
additional redundancy. This holds for the error correction
code proposed for network coding [11], [12] also. This work
describes a Reed-Solomon like code construction that
operates with subspaces instead of Galois symbols.
Cryptographic techniques have also been proposed to
detect attacks in coding-based communication and storage
systems. For instance, in practical P2P file sharing systems,
data blocks are often hashed and the hash values are made
available at a central trusted publisher. By comparing the
hash of each downloaded data block to the corresponding
hash available at the publisher, a node can verify whether a
downloaded block is valid or not.
In order to make this idea work in network coding-based
P2P file sharing systems, the usage of homomorphic hash
functions [13] is proposed in [14], [15]. In the proposed
scheme, the hash of an encoded packet can be easily derived
from the hashes of the blocks contributing to the encoding.
It is assumed that the hash value of every block of a given
file is obtained by the nodes in a secure way when they first
join the system. These hash values are then used to verify
the integrity of the encoded packets as they are down-
loaded. To reduce the computational overhead caused by
homomorphic hash functions, the scheme proposed in [15]
also requires the nodes to cooperate and alert each other
when a maliciously modified block is detected. In this way,
a given node does not verify each and every block itself, but
it can rely on alerts from other peers.
In any case, every scheme that uses hash functions (be it
homomorphic or not) requires the existence of a secure
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channel between the data sources and the destinations
through which the genuine hash values of the original data
blocks can be obtained. We do not assume such secure
channel in our approach.
Another approach to prevent the pollution attack is to
require the source nodes to digitally sign the data blocks
before they are injected in the system. However, in order to
make this work in systems where intermediate nodes
combine data blocks received from different sources, the
digital signature scheme must have some homomorphic
properties, similar to the case of homomorphic hash
functions described above. Recently, homomorphic digital
signature schemes have been proposed for network coding-
based content distribution in [16], [17], [18].
Unlike the approach based on homomorphic hash
functions, the approach of using homomorphic digital
signatures does not require a preexisting secure channel
between the sources and the destinations. However, it has
two other problems: First, homomorphic signature schemes
are computationally even more expensive, and second, they
need a public key infrastructure (PKI) for the management
of the signature verification keys. These problems hinder
their usage in practical applications; in particular, due to the
large computational complexity they cannot be used in
sensor networks, and due to the PKI requirement, it is
unlikely that they will ever be used in large-scale P2P
content distribution systems.
Here, we compare our proposal with homomorphic
signature schemes in terms of overhead.We takeAlgorithm1
for recovery as a basis for comparison. The operation of this
algorithm is the most similar to that of a digital signature
scheme that is cleaning a polluted set with additionally
downloaded clean equations. Our scheme requires ðRþ 1ÞD
additional equations to download, where R ¼ ðkpþ1Þ1p ¼
ðkpþ 1Þ, the number of rounds Algorithm 1 performs, and
D is the size of the data block. The communication overhead
of a digital signature scheme is ksþ ksþW1ðDþ sÞ, where
 ¼ 5ðn=kÞ lnðkÞ, a value taken from [4], meaning the number
of storage nodes a source needs to transmit its data to ensure
successful decoding,W1 ¼ kp is the number of additionally
downloaded equations until k clean equations are found, and
s is the size of the signature. We do not take into account the
overhead required to operate the PKI. Note that the first term
corresponds to the communication overhead of the source
nodes, while our scheme does not add any overhead to the
sources. Comparing the two results, we get that our scheme
has lower communication overhead as long as
D <
ð þ pþ 1Þks
1þ  :
For a practical case when n ¼ 100; k ¼ 10; t ¼ 40, assuming
the length s of the signature is 40 bytes, we get that the
threshold value is D  17;500 bytes. In sensor networks, the
typical size of a data block (few tens of bytes) is much
smaller than this value. In larger systems, this threshold
becomes even larger.
As for the computational complexity, our scheme per-
forms much simpler operations, so if the number of
attacked equations in the system is reasonable, our scheme
performs better. However, the digital signature scheme
scales better for stronger attacks and larger systems, but
contrary to our proposal source nodes also perform
additional computation.
Accordingly, we believe that our proposal is much
more practical than the approach based on homomorphic
digital signatures. First of all, we need neither a PKI, nor
any cryptographic key management scheme, as we do not
use cryptography at all. The practical value of this feature
should not be underestimated. Second, while our approach
also requires intensive computational effort, this is
required only for the entity that retrieves information
from the distributed storage system. In wireless sensor
networks, where the computational overhead really mat-
ters, this entity is typically the base station, which is
usually assumed to be powerful enough. In contrast to
this, in the approach based on homomorphic digital
signatures, the source nodes and the storage nodes need
to perform intensive computation, and those are typically
resource constrained sensor nodes.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we addressed the problem of pollution attacks
in coding-based distributed storage schemes, and we
proposed specific algorithms for detecting and recovering
from such attacks. A salient feature of the proposed
algorithms is that they are not based on cryptographic
checksums or digital signatures, which are traditionally
used for providing integrity services. Instead, we take
advantage of the inherent redundancy in such distributed
storage systems.
In particular, our approach is to obtain more encoded
packets than strictly necessary for the decoding of the
original data, and to use those additional encoded packets
for attack detection and recovery purposes. Both detection
and recovery require only solving systems of linear
equations over a finite field GF ðqÞ. By not using crypto-
graphy, we do not need to rely on a PKI or preestablished
secure channels, which are the usual drawbacks of the
alternative approaches.
The attack detection algorithm that we proposed in the
paper is effective and extremely efficient both in terms of
communication and computational overhead. We proposed
three recovery algorithms as well. The first algorithm
approximates the lowest possible average computational
complexity, while the second algorithm is optimal in terms
of communication complexity, and it ensures recovery from
attacks even if a large fraction of the encoded packets are
modified, but it does not scale up to very large systems in
terms of computational complexity. It is still a practical
solution, though, for many systems. The third algorithm
provides a trade-off for very large systems, it is less
effective in terms of recovery capabilities and less efficient
in terms of communication overhead, but it is computa-
tionally feasible for large systems as well. We presented an
extension of the recovery algorithms to deal with heavy
attacks more efficiently in terms of error probability by
eliminating the effect of a possibly wrong decision of the
attack detection. This makes sense when the adversary
compromises significant portion of the storage nodes and
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aims not only to destroy original data, but also to enforce a
chosen value of the reconstructed data.
The approach that we proposed in this paper can be
applied in any coding-based distributed storage systems, be
it in the domain of P2P file distribution or in wireless sensor
networks. In particular, our approach does not require the
storage nodes to perform additional coding on or to add
additional information to the encoded packets. Only the
collector node needs to perform a substantial amount of
computation. For this reason, we believe that our approach
is particularly suitable for wireless sensor networks, where
the storage nodes are energy constrained sensor nodes,
while the collector is a powerful base station.
APPENDIX A
SIMULATION SETTINGS
In our simulations, we set n ¼ 1;000 and k ¼ 100, and we
range the value of max over the values f4; 5; 6g. For each
value of max, we set
 ¼ max
k max : ð16Þ
The rationale behind this setting of  is the following:
Intuitively, we are prepared to clean at most max attacked
equation in S. If we assume that S, which has size k,
contains max attacked equation, then we may estimate the
probability that a given equation in Z is attacked as max=k.
Thus, the number of intact equations in C, which has size w,
can be estimated as wð1 max=kÞ. In order to be able to
clean S, the number of intact equations in C must be at least
max. Thus, we must have that
max  w 1 max
k
 
; ð17Þ
from which
w  max
1 maxk
¼ max
k max k: ð18Þ
Moreover, for each setting of max and , we range the
number t of attacked equations form 10 to 150 with a step
size of 10. For each setting of the parameters, we run 100
simulations, where the t attacked equations are chosen
uniformly at random in the set Z of n equations.
APPENDIX B
COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY OF ALGORITHM E
Appendix B is provided in the supplemental material to this
paper which can be found in the Computer Society Digital
Library at http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/
TDSC.2010.36.
APPENDIX C
ACCELERATION OF SOLVING SLE
Appendix C is provided in the supplemental material to
this paper which can be found in the Computer Society
Digital Library at http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/
10.1109/TDSC.2010.36..
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